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LABOR v. THE SHERMAN ACT
DAVID F. CAVERS*TiHIS article is not the outgrowth of scholarly research but of
disputation, which the editors of this Review, with the opportun-
ism characteristic of their guild, have diverted to serve their own
editorial ends. In the course on "Law and Economic Organization" which
Mr. Gregory and I have been teaching this year in the University of Chi-
cago Law School, his primary concern has been labor law, mine anti-trust
law. Though the Apex case, led to no jurisdictional dispute between us, it
did produce divergent reactions. Mr. Gregory determined to set his views
on paper; the editors then incited me to comment upon them. This I de-
dined to do, but I did agree to present my own thesis, with the under-
standing that they not expect more than an informal, sketchily-document-
ed outline of my position. The reader, forewarned, should shape his own
expectations accordingly.
Suppose an employer agrees with a union to run a closed shop. This em-
ployer-Smith, Inc.-does an interstate business; most of its materials
and most of its products cross state lines. Though Smith, Inc., is the in-
dustry's Big Shot, its price leader, certainly no one will say that this agree-
ment is "in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States."
Nor do I suppose that there would be any talk of indictment even though
everybody knew that Smith, Inc., had been the last open shop in the trade.
If we were to look into this business of organizing Smith, Inc., we
should probably find that the company had signed the agreement at the
muzzle of a gun, less metaphorically, in response to a threat to strike. Yet
still I should be greatly surprised if the revelation of that familiar phenom-
enon were to lead to a call to the Anti-trust Division, or even the sugges-
tion that the agreement, thus extorted, was invalid and unenforceable.
How explain this apathy to labor's attempt to monopolize through
combination and coerced agreements? 3 Nothing seems more sinister to
* Visiting Professor of Law, University of Chicago (ig4o-4i); Professor of Law, Duke
University; Editor-in-Chief, Law and Contemporary Problems.
'Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (194o).
Gregory, The Sherman Act v. Labor, 8 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 222 (194).
'The simplest explanation would, of course, be the citation of Sections 6 and 20 of the
Clayton Act, but to do so would not only frustrate this inquiry into the application of the
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those who subscribe to the Economics of Despair.4 Why do bench and
bar accept it? I suppose the answer today is that the labor agreement is
cast in a frame of reference-labor law-distinct from the frame of refer-
ence--anti-trust law-in which the problem of industrial restraint falls.
This distinction had been sensed but left inarticulate until Mr. Justice
Stone in the Apex case delimited the scope of the Sherman Act to the
"prevention of restraints to free competition in business and commercial
transactions."' A labor agreement for a dosed shop restrains the employer
in his employing transactions, and control over these has been left a func-
tion of state law, except where in recent years the Federal Government by
specific enactment has assumed it. Moreover, as I think Mr. Justice
Stone persuasively shows, this distinction is embedded in the legislative
history of the Sherman Act.
We should have had a different story, however, if Smith, Inc., had been
tougher. Suppose President Smith, with such other remarks as might have
been appropriate to the occasion, had told the union representative that
he was an agitator, that the dosed shop was un-American, and that he
could go ahead and call a strike. Suppose the union had accepted the in-
vitation and shut the plant tighter than a drum. There wouldn't be any
more interstate commerce to and from Smith, Inc. Once in a while some
bricks would go through the factory windows and a couple of guards
would be beaten up by zealous pickets. Unionized competitors would
Sherman Act but would also be psychologically unrealistic. Nobody thinks about those sec-
tions unless he is contemplating an injunction suit or until, when he gets down to the books,
he encounters the broad language of the concluding clause in Section 20.
4 This school rests the salvation of our economic system (and democracy to boot) upon the
restoration of the automatism of the free market, with implementing monetary and tax
measures. To its members, labor monopoly is peculiarly odious. Cf. Simons, For a Free-
Market Liberalism, 8 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 202, 205 (1941), and McLaughlin, Bottlenecks
(Union-Made Included), 8 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 215, 218 (i941). Since the benefits of the
treatment it would prescribe could be realized in the long run only and since grocers, landlords,
mortgagees, and tax officials operate on the short run, the political prospects for the program
thoroughly warrant the pessimism with which they are viewed by the school's adherents. In-
deed, experience with the protective tariff alone is well-nigh conclusive. That the institutional
trends which the school deplores might be so directed and supplemented by governmental
action as to become compatible with both economic well-being and democracy is rejected as
self-evidently impossible. Even to dally with the idea is to traffic with an economic devil
(sometimes identified by the cabalistic letters NRA) or a political devil (known variously as
nazism, fascism or communism). Mr. Arnold, it should be added, is not a member of this
school; despite his advocacy of the free market, he is disqualified by reason of optimism.
5 Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, £1o U.S. 469, 493 (i94o). The quotation continues: " ...
which tended to restrict production, raise prices or otherwise control the market to the detri-
ment of purchasers or consumers of goods and services .......
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heave simultaneous sighs of relief and probably cut the trade discounts a
few points.
Now while these unhappy events were transpiring, people would sud-
denly begin talking about the Sherman Act. This bothers me. I am puz-
zled why, if it is perfectly legal to threaten to tie up a plant and thereby
extract a binding contract, it should be illegal to make good on that threat.
Since I-together with everybody else--am convinced that the contract,
so far as the Sherman Act is concerned, is an entirely legal restraint, I
start to wondering whether the strike which is necessary to secure that
contract may not be legal also.
As I consider the matter, I recall that the strike I have supposed was
unruly. Can that be the reason the Sherman Act has been violated? I
hardly think so. I find it quite impossible to suppose that whether the
Magna Charta of our industrial liberties has been flouted should turn on
the hurling of bricks or the brawling of pickets. What do we have police
courts for? No, it must be something else.6
Then I note my stipulation that Smith, Inc., is the big company, the
price leader, of the industry. I observe that competitors have profited by
its embarrassment. Probably they have been worried because wage scales
in their shops, even if no higher than in Smith's, are the product of a bar-
gaining process, whereas Smith, Inc., need merely post a notice when a
cut in labor costs seems indicated. If I pried further, I might find that the
dosed shop wage agreements were about to expire, that talk of higher
wages was in the air, that the union employers were showing marked re-
luctance to cooperate so long as Smith, Inc., remained free to go its own
way. Indeed, I might even find that the union officials were convinced
that the only way they could keep what they had or get what they wanted
was to organize that price cutter, Smith.
Now I begin to feel more comfortable. What the union was up to when
they called this strike was to control the market, to keep cheap non-union
goods out of it. So that's the reason they dosed down Smith, Inc. ! Why,
we have "a tampering with price" here ! Surely we can't have one law for
6 Here Section 20 of the Clayton Act bobs up to embarrass me. It stamps as legal certain
union activities, provided they are conducted peaceably. However, it provides defences to
prosecution under the Sherman Act; it does not determine whether an offense thereunder
would have been committed in the first place, and that is our question here. Mr. Justice Stone
in the Apex case makes it quite clear that the manner in which a strike is conducted does not
determine violation of the Sherman Act.
7"Any combination which tampers with price structures is engaged in an unlawful activ-
ity." Douglas, J., in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 3io U.S. 150, 221 (i94o). But
compare Appalachian Coals, Inc., an organization formed, it seems, by singularly disinterested
competitors in a time of ruinous price competition, which, Mr. Justice Stone assures us, "was
not intended to and did not affect market price." Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 3Io U.S. 469,
502 (194-).
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the union and another for Socony-Vacuum. But that comfort is short-
lived. I suddenly realize that we do have one law for the union and an-
other for Socony-Vacuum. When Socony-Vacuum, its fellow "majors,"
and their respective "dancing partners" enter into a gentlemanly arrange-
ment to stabilize (i.e., "tamper with") the price of oil, it's a matter for the
grand jury. But, had our union sewed up Smith, Inc., under economic
duress though without a strike, Mr. Arnold would have read the news in
the papers next morning without turning a hair. What is more, nobody
would have criticized him for his aplomb.
As I look back at the new facts I inserted in my picture, I realize that
what they amount to is this: that the business of organizing Smith, Inc.,
was much more critical for the union than an ordinary organizing job, that
this was due to the state of competition in the market, and that the union
was conscious of these facts. Well, if such facts constitute the element
which makes the strike illegal, then it seems that a union is free to act ex-
cept when it matters most. If a union can legally absorb an industry bit
by bit, with a little strike here and an agreement there, why should it run
afoul of the law when a crisis comes along and, thanks to an unstable
market, union agreements-and strikes to get them-become a matter of
life or death to the union? Of course, if you don't want unions, a legal rule
which works this way is a pretty good rule to have; it won't exterminate
all unions (that too, would be un-American); it will simply keep them in
their place. But if you think that unionization is proper, or if you merely
recognize that our federal laws have permitted and even fostered it, a rule
like that calls for a pretty hardy legal conscience to accept.
It is with regret, therefore, that I report my conclusion that this is just
what Mr. justice Stone has done in the Apex case. Of course he doesn't
think that union agreements for dosed shops in industries producing for
interstate commerce violate the Sherman Act, even where such agreements
blanket an industry. Nor does he think that strikes to exact such agree-
ments are ordinarily illegal. When a strike gets violent, he leaves the em-
ployer to call the local police chief. But if the strike is so important that
it will have a substantial effect on the market (and especially if the organ-
izers know it) then it's a job for the Assistant Attorney General in charge
of the Anti-trust Division.
just how substantial must be this effect which makes strikes (but not
the agreements they are designed to exact) in violation of the Sherman
Act, Mr. Justice Stone does not state. Apparently that question will be
reposed, in the first instance, in the discretion of the Assistant Attorney
General and/or counsel for Smith, Inc., and its numerous counterparts.
The question will next be relegated to the eighty-odd district courts, and,
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if the unions sued still have funds, it can be deliberated in the ten circuit
courts of appeals. Once in a while the Supreme Court will condescend,
upon petition for certiorari, to answer this question which, in my opinion,
it had no business to raise.
The Court had no business to raise this question, not only because in so
doing it produced a rule that is uncertain of application and, when applied
to sustain liability, is inconsistent with the broader position toward union-
ization to which the Court is committed by law, but because raising the
question was unnecessary to the decision of the Apex case which, after all,
was in favor of the defendant. Why the Court indulged in this trouble-
making rationale is not an easy question to answer. One observer much
closer to the problem than I has suggested that the Court desired to se-
cure "a mobile position." If the Supreme Court alone had achieved this
mobility, one might accept such judicial strategy with a degree of equa-
nimity, but, as I have indicated above, the freedom it has accorded itself
is shared with many others. Guerrilla warfare on the "substantial effect"
line may result.
Another hypothesis is, I think, more probable. The Court was under-
taking to execute a delicate maneuver: to shift the basis of its labor de-
cisions under the Sherman Act from constitutional limitations on the com-
merce power to construction of the statute without conceding that, in so
doing, it was changing the law. Unwilling, therefore, to yield a single
position established by the earlier cases, the Court was compelled to de-
velop a rationale which would accommodate the Second Coronado case.8
It is to that effort that the "substantial effect" test is to be attributed, for
in the Second Coronado case a restraint on "business and commercial
transactions" could be shown only by finding that the strike there, unlike
ordinary strikes, had a substantial effect on competition between union
and non-union coal mines.
The Court's task would have been much simpler if it had not been so
intent upon maintaining the appearance of consistency and had aban-
doned the Coronado case as a judicial aberration, extenuated perhaps by
the outrageous conduct of the strikers which doubtless did much to induce
the decision. A far less vulnerable solution could then have been attained
which would have accorded with all the other labor decisions the Court has
rendered. 9
8 Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925). It is of interest that
Mr. justice Stone was a member of the Court deciding this case, a fact that may tend to explain
his solicitous treatment of it.
9 Candor compels me to concede that another case, ignored in both majority and minority
opinions, has to be explained before the number of exceptions may be limited to one. That
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To attain this solution, the question the Court should have raised was:
would the agreement ° which the union was seeking to impose by its strike
have restrained interstate commerce? To that question, the answer is
dearly, no. Interstate commerce flows in and out of dosed shops just as
freely as out of open shops. Since, therefore, the agreement was not within
the scope of the act, the union which was privileged to exact that agree-
ment by the threat of a strike, should be entitled to act on its threat. The
resulting interference to interstate commerce, large or small, should be
recognized, as the Court in the past has recognized it, as incidental to the
settlement of a local labor dispute and of no consequence under the Sher-
man Act.
This is the basis upon which the Court dismissed the suits in the First
Coronado, Leather Workers', and Levering cases.- The Industrial Associa-
tion case," though superfidally different, falls in the same category. Un-
fortunately, the Court in those cases drew the line between the legal and
the illegal by reference to constitutional limitations on the Congressional
power over commerce, couched in terms of "indirect" and "remote" effects
thereon which now seem a bit quaint. But the differences between re-
straints on employing transactions and on business and commercial trans-
actions prove, in application, to be the same as the differences found be-
case, Anderson v. Shipowners Ass'n of the Pacific, 272 U.S. 359 (1926), involved a labor re-
straint in that it presented a combination of competing shipowners who agreed not to hire
union labor. The Court reversed a dismissal of the petitioning union seaman's bill. Although
the restraint was imposed on the employers' employing transactions, nevertheless I think it
may be properly regarded as constituting a restraint on the employers' "freedom in business
and commercial transactions." This paradox is resolved by the fact that the restraint was
imposed by an agreement of competitors. Whether a restraint so imposed operates on a cost
factor or a price factor, it limits the competition among the parties to it in their "business and
commercial transactions." Cf. Hilton v. Eckersley, 6 E. & B. 47 (1857) (an agreement of
competing employers with a labor union is to be sustained on the basis of the union's privilege.)
10 In using the term "agreement," I do not wish to exclude other manifestations of em-
ployer compliance with union demands which fall short of an express agreement.
xxUnited Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922); United Leather
Workers' Int'l Union v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U.S. 457 (1924); Levering & Gar-
rigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. IO3 (1933). In the First Coronado case the Court, it should be
conceded, opened the door to the decision in the second by its helpful suggestions to plaintiff's
counsel.
"Industrial Ass'n of San Francisco v. United States, 268 U.S. 64 (1925). In this case a
combination of dealers in local building materials refused to sell to unionized contractors. The
latter were unable to buy out-of-state materials since those could not be used except in con-
junction with locally supplied materials. Nevertheless, the Court held that the combination
did not violate the Sherman Act. The refusal of the local suppliers to sell obviously restrained
local "business and commercial transactions," but compliance with the combination's anti-
unions demands would have left interstate transactions unaffected.
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tween direct and indirect effects on interstate commerce.13 Moreover,
among the reasons why it is important to differentiate between the two
types of restraint are considerations closely related to the reasons under-
lying the differentiation between direct and indirect effects on commerce.
They go, as Mr. justice Stone himself points out, to the "maintenance in
our federal system of a proper distribution between state and national
government of police authority and of remedies private and public for
public wrongs."' 4
However blurred the line in the Court's opinions in these earlier cases,
points were nonetheless fixed by its decisions therein, and to those points
more are added by the Loewe, Duplex, and Bedford cases.," Rather than
examine each of these three cases here, I shall conjure up a new labor diffi-
culty for a new employer, Brown, Inc., which I think will typify the situa-
tion the cases present.
Brown, Inc., is a firm of moderate size supplying semi-finished goods to
be fabricated further by other companies across the state line. Brown,
Inc., is unionized; some of its customers are also unionized, and their em-
ployees and Brown, Inc.'s belong to the same union. The union decides
to organize the shops of Brown, Inc.'s non-union customers. Since too few
of their present employees are union members to provide the nucleus of a
strike (and since importation of sitters-down to make good the deficit is
no longer in vogue), the union adopts another pressure technique. It in-
forms Brown, Inc., that the union will refuse to work on goods to be
shipped to non-union customers. Now President Brown doesn't feel too
happy about the whole business, but he realizes that he can keep pretty
busy filling larger orders from his union customers and their gratification
can be set off against the grief of their non-union rivals. So Brown, Inc.,
solemnly assures the union that no more goods will be dispatched to com-
fort its enemies.
You will remember that none of us was troubled (anti-trust-wise) when
Smith, Inc., signed for a dosed shop. Does the Brown agreement call for
a comparable display of indifference? I don't think so. Note that the re-
'23 In the Coronado, Leather Workers', Levering, and Apex cases, the strikes sought to im-
pose a restraint on local employing transactions which, if effected, would not restrain interstate
business and commercial transactions. The different effect of the "boycott" cases, which never-
theless sustain the generalization to which this note is appended, is discussed below at p. 255.
The inadequacy of the old rationale becomes most evident in the case of a strike to impose
a labor restraint upon an interstate carrier. The local-interstate differentiation breaks down
and resort must be had to a differentiation based on the character of the transactions restrained
unless strikes of carriers' employees are to be singled out for special treatment under the act.
X4 Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 513 (1940).
1SLoewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (i9o8); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S.
443 (i921); Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeyman Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (i927).
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straint to which Brown, Inc., has been subjected is a restraint on its free-
dom in interstate "business and commercial transactions." Note, too,
that this restraint becomes operative by virtue of the agreement alone;
execution of the threat of refusal to work by a strike would have involved
more customers but, so far as transactions with non-union shops are con-
cerned, the restraint would have been no more effective. Here, then, is a
case which does not involve the anomaly of the legal threat to do an illegal
act for both the successful threat and the successful action involve the
same consequences.
Where, as in the Loewe, Duplex, and Bedford cases, the Supreme Court
has been presented with refusals to buy or to work in order to exact a re-
straint which, if effective, would restrain freedom in "business and com-
mercial transactions" across state lines, it has invoked the Sherman Act.
When we connect the points marked by these cases with the points marked
by the First Coronado, Lealher Workers', Levering, and Apex cases, we
have a line which differentiates the legal from the illegal labor restraint on
the basis of the agreement which the refusal to work or to buy was in-
voked to impose. Only when that agreement would have restrained inter-
state "business and commercial transactions" was liability imposed in
these seven cases.
When, however, Mr. justice Stone extrapolates the "substantial effect"
line which he has drawn to reconcile the points marked by the Second
Coronado and Apex cases, it extends to the cases where the agreement
alone, without the refusal to work or buy, would have restrained inter-
state commerce. It superimposes on cases in the Loewe, Duplex, and Bed-
ford category the requirement that the restraints of the type there in-
volved should have a substantial effect on market competition reflected on
the market price or supply. What is more, since his theory requires it,
Mr. justice Stone does find that effect in the Loewe, Duplex, and Bedford
cases.'6 The effect may have been there though the Court in those cases
did not take occasion to discuss or even to disclose it. 7 In any event, why
x6 "It will be observed that in each of these cases where the Act was held applicable to labor
unions, the activities affecting interstate commerce were directed at control of the market and
were so widespread as to substantially affect it." Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 31o U.S. 469,
5o6 (194o). Later in the same paragraph, Mr. Justice Stone observes that "in the boycott
cases .... the Court viewed the restraint itself .... to be of a kind regarded as offensive at
common law because of its effect in curtailing a free market and it was held to offend against
the Sherman Act because it effected and was aimed at suppression of competition with union
made goods in the interstate market." If only the latter sentence were to be consulted, sub-
stantial effect on the market might be regarded as immaterial, but the opinion as a whole dis-
courages this interpretation.
X7 The Loewe Co. was evidently a small factor in the hat business. The Duplex Printing
Co. was one of four concerns in its field, and Mr. Justice Brandeis' dissent (though not the
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should a person be denied the protection of the Sherman Act simply be-
cause his business is small and the commerce restrained does not bulk
large in the industry total? The market may be insensitive, but you can
bet his profit and loss statement isn't.
Moreover, I should be worried if this emphasis on price and supply led
to their use as crucial factors to determine all cases. Suppose--to resort
to a hypothetical case which I trust will remain fanciful-a group of sup-
pliers of a commodity in interstate commerce were to band together in a
pact to sell no more goods to Negro customers. Suppose that the pro-
scribed customers were few in number and their business small. Freezing
them out of business would have no effect on the market price or on the
volume of trade, and, therefore, if price and supply are determinative, 8
the act would not apply. Yet if that is not an apt case for the act's invoca-
tion, then Mr. Justice Stone and his acquiescing brethren have amended
the statute with greater freedom, and less excuse, than Mr. Justice White
was accused of doing when he read the "rule of reason" into the act.
The first fruits of this treatment of the Loewe, Duplex, and Bedford
cases are at hand. In United States v. Gold'9 Judge Learned Hand, speaking
for the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held a refusal to work on
furs sent from non-union New Jersey processors to New York furriers to
be no violation of the act because he could detect no repercussions on
price or supply. Judge Hand was patently unhappy about it and yielded
reluctantly to the dictate of the higher forum.
Since I read the precedents as he seems to have read them, I sympathize
with his attitude. On the other hand, I recognize that the suppression of
refusals to work or buy'deprives union labor of an important organizing
weapon and therefore seems inconsistent with the more general policy of
the Federal Government in aid of organization. If that more general pol-
majority opinion) indicates that its competition was being felt by its unionized competitors.
In the Bedford case, the Court indicates that the quarries against which the boycott was
directed were large, but it does not state their share of the market nor the effect of the union
activities upon it. (Query, whether this "market" should be defined by the particular type of
stone produced by the quarries in the Bedford region or should the market embrace competing
substitute materials? And, for that matter, is the "market" for Duplex presses to include all
printing presses if the Duplex press is of distinctive design?)
is Although Mr. justice Stone emphasizes price and supply, he does quote, 310 U.S. 469,
5io (194o), from the Leather Workers' case (265 U.S. 457, 471 (1924)) a passage making the
illegality of a restraint depend on whether "the intent or necessary effect upon such commerce
in the article is to enable those preventing the manufacture to monopolize its supply or con-
trol its price, or discriminate as between its would-be purchasers." And at page Soi he states that
a restraint is not illegal unless it is "shown to have or is intended to have an effect on prices
in the market or otherwise to deprive consumers or purchasers of the advantages which they derive
from free competition." (Italics added.)
19 115 F. (2d) 236 (C.C.A. 2d I94O).
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icy is to prevail, then the line I have found in the decisions must be shifted
and new points substituted for those marked by the existing precedents.
I think such a change would be compatible with the retention of my gen-
eral analysis.
Let's go back to the labor troubles of Brown, Inc. I argued there that
its agreement not to supply goods to non-union customers across the state
line or its employees' refusal to work on such goods imposed a restraint
on its interstate "business and commercial transactions" and therefore
fell within the scope of the act. But it must be recognized that this re-
straint was incidental to a labor dispute in which Brown's customers were
involved, that the restraint would be coterminous with that dispute, and
would probably have only the same temporary disruptive effect as a strike
in the customer's own shop. Given the importance to organization of this
tactic, the community of interest between the employees of both Brown,
Inc., and its customers, and the temporary nature of the dislocation, a
court which has always accorded a certain latitude to industrial restraints
might not be open to censure if it were to indulge labor in a privilege lim-
ited by the considerations noted above.2° I do not, however, like to see
that privilege further limited by the rule, which seemingly now prevails,
that the privilege is to be accorded only when a stable market or the un-
importance of those against whom it is exercised precludes a finding of
"substantial effect" on market price or supply.
If the Loewe, Duplex, and Bedford cases are to be discarded, are there
any labor restraints on which the act may nonetheless operate? There are,
and I believe they are important. An obvious example is the situation pre-
sented in the Brims case2" where a union combined with employers in an
agreement not to work on goods shipped into the state from manufac-
turers of a product which competed with the local employers' product.
Here there was an obvious restraint on interstate "business and commer-
cial transactions" and a unanimous Court held it illegal. Unlike the re-
straint in the case of Brown, Inc., this restraint was not incidental to a
labor dispute across the state line which would have ended with the end-
ing of that dispute. It was an effort to impose a permanent embargo on
goods produced outside the state. The collusion of employers and the
a* This could be done either by an invocation of the "rule of reason" or by reversing the
restrictive interpretation placed on Section 20 of the Clayton Act by the Duplex case. The
Court in the Apex case points to, but does not pass on, both possibilities. 310 U.S. 469, 507 nn.
25, 26 (i94o). Either alternative would permit discrimination among the three types of cases.
It is easiest to defend the restraint imposed in the Bedford case, since it was in aid of members
of the same union. In the Duplex case the aid of other unions was involved; in the Loewe case
the entire federation was called upon to boycott the plaintiff's hats.
21 United States v. Brims, 272 U.S. 549 (1926).
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unions to advance their respective ends deprived the maneuver of any
color of justifiation.
The Anti-trust Division of the Department of Justice is turning up a
good many such unholy alliances in the course of its current "building
drive," but there are perhaps still more cases where the employers are re-
luctant partners to the restraint. These are the cases where the unions
restrain their employers from interstate purchases of goods which will
diminish the need for union labor at the point of use. To cite an example
from the books, there is the Kitchen Cabinet case- in which a union re-
fused to install kitchen cabinets painted by spray gun at the out-of-state
factory rather than by brush on the job. Such restraints are all too com-
mon in the building trades, and many of those who readily sympathize
with the refusal to work on non-union supplies are slow to countenance
this other tactic. Not only does it restrain interstate "business and com-
mercial transactions" but it does so permanently--or until the union re-
laxes its grip or alters its objectives.23 Whether or not the specific re-
straint in the local market affects the price on the national market, the
supply of sprayed kitchen cabinets in the locality of the restraint is nil,
and the higher costs of brush painting must be paid. Here is an important
objective for Anti-trust Division activity and, in its current attack, the
division is doing an excellent job.
However, the division has gone further. It is prosecuting restraints
imposed by strikes where the agreements sought by the unions would not
have restrained "business and commercial transactions." An outstanding
example is afforded by the Hutcheson case 4 now awaiting decision in the
Supreme Court. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., employed union machinists to
install equipment in an addition to its brewery. The union carpenters
coveted the work, and, when the contractor refused to discharge the
machinists, the carpenters struck. Mr. Arnold, in common with most of
us, doesn't like jurisdictional strikes, and so he moved in. He relies on
the interference with interstate commerce resulting from the suspension of
building operations and the consequent postponement of brewing opera-
tions to bring the restraint within federal power and on the fact that the
United States v. Painters' District Council No. 14, 44 F. (2d) 58 (D.C. Ill. 193o), aff'd
per curiam 284 U.S. 582 (1931).
23 If, in such a case, it could be shown that the restraint the union was seeking to impose
was a method of mitigating the incidence of technological change upon the union by providing
an orderly process of introducing a new product or process, then the restraint might be deemed
reasonable, and Nat'l Ass'n of Window Glass Mfrs. v. United States, 263 U.S. 403 (1923), could
be invoked to sustain it.
24 United States v. Hutcheson, 32 F. Supp. 6oo (Mo. 194o), probable jurisdiction noted, 310
U.S. 6og (x94o), and argued before the Supreme Court on December io, i94o.
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carpenters were not pursuing a reasonable labor objective to establish
violation of the act.2 5 Since he did not abandon the case upon the rendi-
tion of the Apex decision it is evident that he does not consider the re-
quirement of "substantial effect" on the market to be applicable here.
Apparently he views that as a criterion to be applied only to find a busi-
ness or commercial restraint to accompany and invalidate an otherwise
valid labor restraint. 6 Where there is no valid labor restraint to begin
with, 2 7 then the substantiality test may be disregarded, a qualification
which Mr. Justice Stone overlooked in his opinion but which he may now
be persuaded to adopt.
What is there to complain of in this solution of the problem, aside from
the complaints already registered with respect to so much of the Apex
version of the Second Coronado case as remains unaffected by the inter-
polated qualification? What troubles me is that Mr. Arnold is using the
Sherman Act to police labor restraints even though, if effected by agree-
ment, they do not restrain interstate "business and commercial trans-
actions." That a labor restraint is invalid because its objectives are un-
reasonable does not make it ipsofacto a business or commercial restraint, 8
yet if Mr. Arnold determines that a restraint imposed upon an employer's
freedom in employment is unreasonable, prosecution begins. What is un-
reasonable in this context is not to be derived from policies developed to
protect freedom in business and commercial transactions but from policies
shaped to demarcate the zone of permissible labor activity. Mr. Arnold
may be a wise policeman but, in embarking on this program, he has in-
voluntarily deputized every employer engaged in interstate commerce.
If the Federal Government is to curb excesses in the labor activity which it
has fostered, I suspect it can best do so by legislation specifically designed
to that end, the enforcement of which may be entrusted exclusively to
policemen who, like Mr. Arnold, are disinterested and sympathetic to the
socially desirable objectives of the labor movement.
25 The carpenters, of which defendant Hutcheson is president, published notices that
Anheuser-Busch was unfair to organized labor, requesting patronage be withdrawn from its
products. The district court found no secondary boycott, and held the means employed by
the union lawful under the Clayton Act. The discussion in the text is not directed to this
aspect of the case.
a6 E.g., a strike for higher wages, shorter hours, or a closed shop.
27 It is difficult to consider a jurisdictional strike as not constituting a "labor dispute"
within the terms of the Clayton Act, even where resort to such a strike may be highly arbitrary.
28 A jurisdictional dispute may involve a violation of the Sherman Act under the test pro-
posed in this article. Suppose an AFL union refuses to work on goods on which CIO, rather
than AFL, unionists have previously worked in shops across the state line. If the employer
agrees, he will have restrained his freedom in business and commercial transactions.
